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ABSTRACT. Inclusionary higher educational practices have become a topical issue 
in recent debates on the Africa continent. While the idea of inclusion in communal 
practices is embodied in the notion of Ubuntu in Africa, a number of silences and 
inconsistencies still remain in the way the marginalized groups (the poor, people 
with disabilities, women, homosexuals and so forth) are treated in African higher 
education (AHE). The dilemmas implicit in the idea of inclusion in contemporary 
higher education institutions (HEIs) in Africa restrict the marginalized group’s 
voices, thereby treating them as unequal members of the assumed equal society. 
This suggests that an African conception of Ubuntu in its current form may not bring 
about adequate transformation to the African higher education system. The 
underlying assumption in the existing conception of Ubuntu as a communal practice 
‒ more specifically knowledge culture ‒ of seeing humanity in others provides 
sufficient grounds for the inclusion of all members of society. Employing Young’s 
(2000) interpretation of inclusion as exclusion, Ubuntu in dominant and current 
thinking and practices can be inclusive and exclusive simultaneously. The article 
proposes to re-examine the potentiality of an African philosophy of Ubuntu as a way 
of curtailing exclusionary practices in higher education (HE). As long as HE in 
Africa embraces Ubuntu as inclusion, a substantive form of inclusion may not be 
engendered. The article makes its argument using Rancière’s perspective of 
“equalization of voice.” By arguing for an Ubuntu of inclusion as voice, we make a 
cogent defense for thinking differently about African people’s communal practices, 
thus looking differently at their conception of a knowledge culture.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Central to the contemporary higher education debates lies the question of 
whether or not Ubuntu as an African philosophy and way of life can assist in 
promoting inclusionary institutions on the continent. Ubuntu as an African 
epitome of inclusion has become a topical issue and prevalent framework in 
curtailing unjust practices in contemporary African higher education (AHE) 
and in other institutions of democratic society. However, although different 
scholars’ perspectives of Ubuntu exhibit unique elements that could 
engender a genuine inclusionary society, we deem it necessary to 
reconceptualize this dominant African philosophy of Ubuntu (humanness) as 
a worldview and its relevance to higher education (HE). At stake are the 
incongruences between the theoretical understanding of Ubuntu and the 
practices in higher education institutions attested to by unsubstantive 
inclusion of the marginalized groups, especially women. Contemporary 
research findings on the place of women in higher education in Africa 
indicate a grave lack of access and inclusion, an increasing number of the 
marginalized groups, as well as marginalization of their voice (see Assié-
Lumumba, 2007; Shanyanana, 2014). This then poses a challenge to the 
current conception of Ubuntu as inclusion as a salient approach in 
transforming higher education in Africa. This paper observes that scholars 
who have discussed Ubuntu as a moral approach and an ideal framework for 
promoting transformation (e.g. Ramose, 2002; Wiredu, 2004; Waghid, 2011; 
Metz, 2014; and others), or Ubuntu in relation to the inclusion of 
marginalized groups, particularly women, or those who have discussed 
women’s access to and inclusion in higher education (like Kwesiga, 2002; 
Mama, 2006; Assié-Lumumba, 2007; etc.) have not connected Ubuntu as 
inclusion to equalization of voice.  
Thus, this paper reconceptualizes Ubuntu in relation to the equalization of 
voice beyond statistical representation based on gender, and explores 
equalization of voice that can be applied through university pedagogy. In 
doing this, we firstly probe the existing understandings of Ubuntu as a 
traditional African philosophy by showing its characteristics and 
distinctiveness. Secondly, we expose the incongruences between the 
understanding of Ubuntu and its exclusionary practices, resulting in unequal 
representation of all people, especially the marginalized groups ‒ the poor, 
people with disabilities, women and homosexuals ‒ in higher education in 
Africa despite the shift to democratic rule claimed by many African 
countries. Thirdly, we substantiate our call for an understanding of Ubuntu 
as inclusion using Young’s (2000) interpretation of inclusion as exclusion. 
Fourthly, we demonstrate the plausibility of a post-liberal Rancièrean (1999) 
perspective of equalization of voice as an alternative approach in advancing 
substantive inclusion in HE, specifically in university pedagogy. We contend 
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that if Ubuntu, as an African philosophy and conception of a knowledge 
culture, can be framed differently, HE potentially may engender substantive 
inclusion. 
 
2. African Conception of Inclusion in Understanding Higher Education 
 
This section explores the meanings, characteristics and distinctiveness of 
Ubuntu as an African philosophy and way of life. Van Binsbergen (2002: 6) 
perceives Ubuntu as a revived African concept that does not only focus on a 
particular locality or region, but rather on the entire continent, while De 
Tejada (cited in Ramose, 2002: 324) sees Ubuntu as a way of life and 
practice of many Africans in most parts of the continent, especially in those 
regions stretching “from the Nubian desert to the Cape of Good Hope and 
from Senegal to Zanzibar.” However, Ramose explains that this 
geographical delimitation is problematic, since it creates a barrier to the 
desert as Africa’s birthmark, and therefore obscures the meaning and import 
of human interaction on the continent before the desert sneaked in. This 
means that connecting a philosophy of Ubuntu to a geographical location 
may limit its relevance to the entire continent. Mapaure (2011: 160) affirms 
that Ubuntu is used in several Bantu languages, manifesting an African 
philosophical worldview, in terms of which each person is regarded as a 
human being who may engage in all processes of knowledge. Put succinctly, 
Waghid (2009: 76) confirms that Ubuntu means “human interdependence 
through deliberative inquiry … [that] exists in most of the African 
languages, although not necessarily under the same name.” In other words, 
an African philosophy of Ubuntu is not something new; it must have existed 
among the peoples of Africa since ancient times. In the following sub-
sections, we further explore the meanings, fundamental nature and 
significance of Ubuntu in relation to the practices in higher educational 
institutions.  
 
2.1 Ubuntu as Inclusion – An African Perspective 
 
Ramose (2002) offers a comprehensive conception of Ubuntu in three 
maxims: “The first means that to be human is to affirm one’s humanity by 
recognizing the humanity of others and, on that basis, establish respectful 
human relations with them. The second entails that if and when one is faced 
with a decisive choice between wealth and the preservation of the life of 
another human being, then one should opt for the preservation of life.” The 
third maxim is a “principle deeply embedded in traditional African political 
philosophy,” which says “that the king owed his status, including all the 
powers associated with it, to the will of the people under him” (Ramose, 
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2002: 324–325). This implies that the concept of Ubuntu is a personified 
way of life – a word with no English equivalent.  
The first designation means “a person is a person through other persons,” 
based on the Zulu maxim, “umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu” (Ramose, 1999: 
49). This shows how the being of an African person is not only embedded in 
the community, but in the universe as a whole. This is articulated mainly in 
the prefix ubu- of the word Ubuntu, which, refers to the universe as being 
enfolded, containing everything. The stem -ntu means the process of life as 
the unfolding of the universe by concrete manifestations in different forms 
and modes of being. This process includes the emergence of the speaking 
and knowing human being (Ramose, 2002: 325). As such, this being is 
called umuntu or, in the Northern Sotho language, motho – one who is able 
by common endeavors to articulate the experience and knowledge of what 
ubu is. Thus, -ntu stands for the epistemological side of “being.” This is the 
wider horizon against which the intersubjective aspects of Ubuntu should be 
seen. Mutual recognition and respect in the different intersubjective relations 
are parts of the process of the unfolding of the universe, which encompasses 
everything in the speaking and knowing of human beings. In the main, 
Ubuntu as a philosophical concept is associated with the being of a person, 
which is determined by his or her association with other persons in 
intersubjective community. 
Likewise, Letseka (in Waghid, 2011: 240) regards boto or Ubuntu “as 
normative in that it encapsulates moral norms and virtues such as kindness, 
generosity, compassion, benevolence, courtesy, and respect and concern for 
others.” The idea of respect and concern for others is more profound and 
implies the inclusion of all, because even those who seem to experience 
some exclusion are considered. Ramose (2002: 325) underlines the oneness 
and wholeness of this ongoing establishment of community. One can 
surmise that the oneness of African philosophy is perceivable in the plurality 
of its voices, and that no voice should be disregarded in the whole 
community of engagement. In particular, the notion of Ubuntu underlies the 
communalism by which the African community is characterized. For 
Ramose, the meaning of Ubuntu indicates that there is an elevated judgment 
of the community in African thought and practice, which is greater than that 
of the individual, but that does not take place at the expense of overlooking 
the individuality of the person. A person is a person in the community, and 
his or her individuality is exercised through others in that community. This 
attests to a culture of mutual relations, of caring for one another and sharing 
with one another. We infer that the underlying principle of Ubuntu 
emphasizes a community, which clearly exhibits an opportunity for 
inclusion, that is, one in which everyone is included in deliberation. If it is 
correct that AHE upholds Ubuntu, then no one is supposed to be excluded 
and their voices will be heard in policy, practices, as well as in decision 
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making. Although there might be some disagreement between members in 
the AHE community, each member could depend on other members of the 
community for sustenance and support.  
Augmenting the distinctiveness of Ubuntu, Metz (2014: 6761) further 
states that “[t]o have Ubuntu is to be a person who is living a genuinely 
human way of life, whereas to lack Ubuntu is to be missing human 
excellence or to live like an animal.” Tutu (1999: 34–35) declares that “a 
person is a person through other people; that I am human because I belong, I 
participate, and I share… [I am] open and available to others, affirming of 
others, [and do] not feel threatened that others are able and good.” This 
means that one belongs to a greater whole and is diminished when others are 
humiliated or diminished. The concept of “I belong, I participate and I 
share” could be said to underscore what it means to cultivate an inclusive 
environment. Again, the phrase “a person is a person through other people” 
assumes that, when some people are excluded and mistreated, others should 
act to address the problem. In other words, when some people, for instance, 
are humiliated or oppressed they are regarded inhumanely, and this points to 
the absence of Ubuntu in the practice.  
Poignantly, Maathai (2009) posits that the exclusion of marginalized 
groups, especially women, is due in particular to the elongated colonial 
ideology and patriarchal system that perceive some people as inferior and as 
needing representation (see also Kwesiga, 2002; Assié-Lumumba, 2007). 
We therefore question the significance of Ubuntu, which attests to the 
absence of a legitimate form of human interdependence in HE practices in 
Africa. Equally, Wiredu (2004) points out that an African philosophy of 
Ubuntu as inclusion cannot be articulated without any reference to what it 
means for a person, specifically an African – whether a man or a woman – to 
be educated. Thus, AHE need to shape human action in a way that is 
comparable with and analogous to its fundamental ideas, meanings and 
practice (in this case Ubuntu) within its context. Hence, AHE ought to act 
out the democratic element of Ubuntu, that is inclusion, in which all are 
acknowledged as equal members of the same community. Waghid and 
Smeyers (2012: 6–7) affirm that Ubuntu as an African philosophy represents 
a form of human activity that can create space in higher education, in which 
all people can engage freely with one another deliberatively through 
practices and shared values such as Ubuntu. Yet, taking into account the 
abovementioned distinctiveness, we question whether Ubuntu as inclusion is 
indeed embraced and practiced in AHE, especially in relation to the 
marginalized groups. 
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2.2 Inconsistency in Meanings and Practices of Ubuntu as Inclusion  
 
The underlying understanding of Ubuntu as inclusion rests firstly on the idea 
of a communal practice, which by its nature is inclusive. Ubuntu as a 
contextualized approach centers on a community of engagement of all 
members, and this understanding of Ubuntu, if extended to HE, would make 
a case for inclusionary practices. In this sense, the phrase “I am because we 
are” is a manifestation of inclusion through Ubuntu, which AHE ought to 
encourage. The idea that an African philosophy of Ubuntu is underlined by 
“I as we” makes AHE problematic, as some people seemingly remain 
excluded.  
Despite the existing inclusiveness in the communal practices embodied in 
the notion of Ubuntu, as explained above, there remains a grave exclusion of 
the marginalized groups (in this case women), who also are treated 
unequally. Innumerable studies have shown that women have been, and still 
are being, excluded from African HE (Kwesiga, 2002: 152; Mama, 2006; 
Assié-Lumumba, 2007). A study conducted by the London Institute of 
Education (2005: 10) shows that the percentage of female enrolment in HE 
in Africa is low. Nigeria has 39.9%, Tanzania 24% and Uganda 34%, while 
Lesotho has 50% and South Africa has 53% female enrolment. Many of the 
female students in AHE are clustered at the undergraduate level, and more 
are studying for certificates and diplomas, while fewer women are found at 
the Master’s and doctoral levels. Similarly, a study of 32 universities in 16 
African countries found that a larger proportion of university dropouts 
consisted of female students (Leathwood & Read, 2009: 3). This denotes that 
women not only are underrepresented numerically, but they also are at a 
greater risk of non-completion and dropping out. So, the way HE limits 
women’s equal access to its practices seems to suggest that there is no space 
for them, thus confirming a kind of exclusion.  
The above depiction corroborates the inconsistency between the 
conception of Ubuntu as inclusion and practices in relation to the 
marginalized groups, especially women in HE on the continent, since the 
current understanding of Ubuntu as inclusion centers on the idea of seeing 
humanity in others and having concern for the other. HE then ought to enact 
inclusionary practices in which all people could be included, irrespective of 
their differences. What is significant is that the inclusion of all people 
becomes something in agreement with Ubuntu, not something divergent 
from or in contrast with it. Excluding the marginalized groups from HE 
means that they are being disregarded and treated inhumanely. Such 
elements of exclusion in the practice of AHE seem to affirm, to some extent, 
Enslin and Horsthemke’s (2004: 57) distrust of a limited understanding of 
Ubuntu. It remains unclear how characteristically African ways of 
philosophizing are meant to help resolve problems and clarify issues in 
 110 
education. The authors’ concern seems credible, especially considering that 
Ubuntu exists in the language of African societies, yet some people remain 
excluded from HE. Here, to substantiate our argument for the inconsistencies 
in meanings and practices within Ubuntu as inclusion, especially the 
exclusion of the marginalized groups, we draw from Young’s interpretation 
of inclusion as exclusion. 
 
2.3 Ubuntu as Inclusion with Subtle Forms of Exclusion  
 
The conception of Ubuntu as inclusion entails involving others or inviting 
them to participate in doing something in public. Inclusion is recognized as a 
norm for democratic society, including the HE community (Young, 2000: 
23–25), where public deliberative engagement is the norm. Inclusive 
processes of communication ought to be marked by people’s disposition to 
be accountable to others and make deliberation open to the public, making it 
accessible for it to count as normatively legitimate (Young, 2000: 13). This 
approach envisages that decisions on how to address and promote inclusive 
democratic institutions, such as HE in Africa, are legitimate. For Young, a 
justified Ubuntu as inclusion can only happen when all stakeholders are 
included in the process, which inclusion needs to occur irrespective of their 
gender and other differences. Within Ubuntu as inclusion, each person has 
the right to be included and treated as important in the dialogues and 
decision-making processes from which their voices and interests previously 
were excluded. So, exclusion happens when some people, specifically the 
marginalized groups, experience subtle forms of exclusion within public 
institutions – in this case higher education in Africa. Young’s (2000) 
interpretation of Ubuntu as exclusion inherent in inclusion can be viewed in 
two forms, namely external exclusion and internal exclusion. External 
exclusion occurs when some members are kept out of the democratic 
community and its debates or decision-making processes, to the extent that 
such people (e.g. women) are not involved in a community of engagement 
and in public discourses due to their status in society (Young, 2000: 52–53). 
Internal exclusion happens when individuals or groups are represented 
formally in social institutions, but excluded from the discussion and 
decision-making process by means of a specific style of expression; the use 
of language that is difficult to understand; and the dismissal of the 
participation of some people as being out of order. Young (2000) states that, 
while mechanisms are accelerated to include all stakeholders, new forms of 
exclusion come into play, that is, exclusion is concurrently intrinsic within 
inclusive democratic processes. 
In terms of HE efforts to address external exclusion, the study (London 
Institute of Education, 2005: 5) shows that there also is a sizeable gender gap 
in staff employment, particularly at higher decision-making levels. Of the 
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four Commonwealth African universities examined, the percentage of 
women at professor, associate professor and senior lecturer levels was 
decidedly lower than that of men. Statistics of the position of professor held 
by women at the four universities showed that Ibadan University had 12.5%; 
the University of Cape Town 7%; Dar es Salam University 5.2%; and 
Makerere University 6.1%. Positions of associate professor held by women 
constituted 17% at the University of Cape Town; 14.8% at Dar es Salaam; 
and 20% at Makerere (London Institute of Education, 2005: 5). In addition, 
statistics of women as rectors, vice-chancellors, deputy chancellors, 
registrars, executive directors and deans of faculties showed that, in 2006, in 
the overall gender proportion of the 92 African universities, only four 
countries attained 30%, namely Lesotho, Mauritius, Namibia and Swaziland. 
Countries such as South Africa, Mozambique, Uganda and Botswana had 
28%, while the rest had between 0 and 24 % representation of women 
(Onokala & Onah, 1998: 10–12). Evidently, women are accessing AHE, 
although they are underrepresented as students at the Master’s and PhD 
levels, and as senior staff members. Teferra and Altbach (2004: 21) highlight 
that the challenges experienced by female students include a lack of access 
to HE at many universities in Africa. Mainly, we argue that HE seems to be 
addressing external exclusion, although in minimal ways.  
In terms of women’s experiences of internal exclusion, Maürtin-
Cairncross’s (2013: 1) study conducted in South Africa showed that women 
experience some sense of invisibility and exclusion within their workplaces, 
and various academic respondents stated that: 
  
Women are made to feel invisible[;] one is often called to 
meetings and informed of decisions that were made. When 
challenging these decisions, you are ‘allowed’ to speak but at the 
end of your discussion, the initial decision is reiterated as if you 
had not spoken at all. That is the reason that some women become 
aggressive … they want to be heard; they want their opinions to be 
taken seriously. When they react in this way, they are labelled 
emotional … So what does one do [?] I have taken to remain[ing] 
silent … (Respondent 1, higher education executive). 
 
The work climate females experience in a very covert way 
excludes women from the real decision making … They [the men] 
have a camaraderie which excludes women, in the real sense. 
Women are listened to, without taking their points seriously. 
[Men’s] importance and being busy becomes an excuse for 
hoarding information and creating a sense of power that hides 
their inefficiencies (Respondent 2, higher education executive). … 
being overlooked because of perceptions about you (age, EI 
[emotional intelligence], intelligence not being taken seriously by 
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the senior managers and being overlooked for the work you 
deliver on in favour of someone else …) (Respondent 5, director).  
 
From the above we can deduce that women, especially those in senior 
positions, often feel excluded from decision making because their presence 
and ideas are ignored. Noticeably, women’s experiences demonstrate that, 
when they feel invisible and excluded, especially when there only are a few 
women in senior positions in which they are expected to influence decisions 
and policy making, they become afraid to act with confidence. The following 
quotations from Maürtin-Cairncross’s study (2013: 1) reflect some of these 
sentiments: 
 
Lack of confidence on the part of many women [keeps them from 
being] bold and stand[ing] up for themselves (Respondent 5, 
director). 
Male counterparts … are driven by a fear that they may lose 
power and therefore they do not share it. They do self-esteem-
lowering things – ignore people … [implying] I am busier than 
you and therefore I can give you only limited time and space! 
Women’s need to be made to feel valued is never addressed. 
Building self-esteem … you have to find these things for yourself 
and spend energy on ‘bouncing back’ and keeping your own 
power as they will take it away from you and make you feel 
inferior; if you are not working from an inner centre of strength 
you are doomed (Respondent 2, higher education executive).  
 
The above illustrates how people without self-confidence could find it 
difficult to assert their voices as equal agents and stand up for their 
arguments, largely because of the fact that there are few women 
representatives in senior positions. On the other hand, the challenge faced is 
due to women’s resistance to support one another’s standpoints, as well as 
their promotion. We agree with Maürtin-Cairncross (2013: 2) that, even 
though the “dominant social groups often control the channels of 
communication, reinforcing women’s subordinate status, when academic 
women do not challenge dominant institutional cultures, they may tacitly 
accept subordinate status.” This suggests that only when women have the 
confidence to challenge these exclusionary attitudes and practices by 
demanding their equal space might their ideas possibly be taken into 
consideration as a way of attaining internal inclusion. The foregoing views 
show clearly that HE has reached the point of addressing external inclusion, 
although in minimal ways. The dilemma facing HE is how to halt internal 
inclusion. A notion of Ubuntu as both inclusion and exclusion, as argued for 
by Young (2000), presumes that women’s presence in African HE will be far 
more inclusive than a reliance on mere statistics. This view reinforces our 
argument that, although Ubuntu as inclusion is a plausible framework for 
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facilitating public deliberation for an inclusive democratic society, exclusion 
is inherent within inclusion.   
In response to the question whether Ubuntu is perfect, Appiah (1996: 
134) responds that Ubuntu should not be regarded as a flawless worldview, 
but as a concept with merit that could be explored in order to assist in 
recognizing others as reasonable. As such, no educational institution in 
Africa could claim to practice Ubuntu without affording equal space to all to 
contribute reasonably to all pressing issues. Thus, Appiah’s notion of 
recognizing others as reasonable beings should be at the center of Ubuntu as 
an inclusive philosophy in African societies, including in the HE 
community. However, since some people often are excluded, the practice of 
Ubuntu as inclusion requires further scrutiny and expansion. Appiah (1996: 
135) calls for a critical reflection on our understanding and practice of 
fundamental concepts such as Ubuntu in order to bring about +change for 
the educational community of engagement to make sense. In other words, if 
Ubuntu symbolizes a community of practice and human dignity, the 
placement of some people on the margin, as well as the perception of them 
as passive members, then Ubuntu in its current form may not bring adequate 
transformation to the AHE system. What follows is a Rancièrean notion of 
equality of voice as an alternative in promoting Ubuntu that potentially could 
engender substantive inclusion.  
 
3. A Rancièrean Conception of Ubuntu as Inclusion:  
    Post-liberal Perspective  
 
Rancière (1999) offers a unique approach to thinking about Ubuntu as 
inclusion to achieve equality that describes a way to act out, rather than a 
mere distributed and received equality. This means that participants in these 
case women should be allowed to act out in terms of voice to make 
meaningful contribution to decision makings and other forms of democratic 
processes. For Rancière, equality is the presupposition of those who act on 
their own behalf, rather than being represented by others. The idea of acting 
on their own behalf ties in very well with an inclusive HE, in which all 
people, engage in educational practices and demand their deliberative 
spaces. Nonetheless, when people are being represented, the representatives 
act in support of others for the purpose of achieving equality on the 
assumption that they are acting on behalf of others, that is the marginalized 
groups ‒ the poor, people with disabilities, women, homosexuals and so 
forth ‒ who are incapable of asserting their own equality. To put it 
succinctly, Rancière points out that equality cannot be achieved only when 
those who are deprived of it receive it through others, but also when they 
engage in educational deliberations in their own capacity. In concurrence 
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with Rancière (1999: 30), equality is a way of disrupting and attaining 
justice, and that is what all people are entitled to expect from the state or 
social institutions (higher education) in which they happen to find 
themselves. So, attaining equality is based on how people ought to act and 
what they do while claiming their equality – even in African higher 
education arrangements. For him, equality is not a principle of receptivity or 
passivity – attained by being visible in AHE without making any meaningful 
contribution. Rather, it is a principle of activity (Rancière, 1999: 33). We 
found Rancière’s view of people engaging in a particular activity to demand 
equality, equal voice, rather than waiting as passive recipients of what is 
being distributed to them, quite compelling. This approach has the potential 
to engender equality in HE, as it could empower and change the position of 
the marginalized, especially women, and enable them to air their voices like 
their male counterparts. Thus, only when AHE creates an enabling 
atmosphere in which all voices are heard can substantive inclusion be 
achieved.  
The potential question is how the excluded groups may demand their 
inclusion? Rancière (1992: 4–8) states that all humans are equally intelligent, 
and that the difference between them lies not in their intelligence, but in their 
attention. Since all human beings have equal intelligence, everyone ought to 
be afforded a space to unleash their intelligence in AHE. So, Ubuntu as 
inclusion in HE needs to be advanced by captivating the intelligence of all 
people irrespective of their differences. In response to whether those who 
have been deprived of HE, particularly the marginalized groups, possibly 
could act out and exercise their equality of intelligence, Rancière (1992: 46) 
posits that equality of intelligence does not imply that students (people) have 
the capability of scoring the same marks or grades; rather, it implies equality 
of intelligence on a standard base. In other words, intellectual skills may 
vary from one person to another, but we are equally capable of using those 
skills to communicate, to discuss, to make decisions, and to take account of 
the world around us. To understand and practice equality, Rancière (1992: 
46) argues that “[o]ur problem isn’t proving that all intelligence is equal. It’s 
seeing what can be done under that supposition. And for this, it’s enough for 
us that the opinion be possible – that is, that no opposing truth can be 
proved.” Stated differently, it is clear that human beings possess equal 
intellectual abilities that can be nurtured. Equality should be approached on 
this basis.  
Within this framework, equality of voice ought to rest in a person’s 
ability to be attentive to what is seen and what is spoken in the world around. 
Intelligence is, first, “attention and research before being a combination of 
ideas” (Rancière, 1992: 54–56). Interestingly, in order to establish one 
another’s intelligence, people have to listen attentively to the point of view 
of others, and this can be done in HE in Africa by including all people and 
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treating them as equal partners. In Rancière’s (1992: 57) view, the notion of 
being attentive is said to be “the moral foundation of the power to know.” 
However, this moral act, in turn, is not to be used to condemn others, but is a 
moral act of being truthful to oneself, and to start from the fact that “not 
knowing yourself would be a contradiction in terms” (Rancière, 1992: 57). 
Regarding the equality of intelligence, what we consider interesting is the 
exploration of the power that is set free by any man or woman when he or 
she judges himself/herself equal to everyone else, and judges everyone else 
as equal. It is further  posited that, for everyone to engage in the community 
of intelligence (e.g. HE), there is a need for the distant being to 
communicate, translate and counter-translate in order to move ahead with 
others. In this respect, the community of intelligence ought to embody the 
ability to be attentive, which is a fundamental attribute of education. This is 
why Rancière (1992: 64–65) rightly points to three ways in which 
attentiveness can be inculcated – the first is the shift from intelligence to 
attention; the second explains what it means to be attentive; and the third 
considers the consequences of such a view for education, and for forms of 
teaching in AHE in particular. Finding one’s voice and the equality of 
intelligence could have a substantial influence and possibly may address 
inequality in AHE. However, to advance “equalization of voice,” AHE 
should reconstruct ways of including the marginalized groups based on 
voice.  
In essence, through Ubuntu as inclusion through “equalization of voice,” 
AHE ought to nurture in all people, regardless of their gender, some sense of 
assertiveness, which may enable them to engage in debates and offer their 
reasons with confidence. At the same time, there is a need to cultivate the 
ability to listen, with attentive listening, as Rancière (1999) puts it, to all 
members of an educational community as a way of promoting internal 
inclusion. The above view suggests that human beings, regardless of their 
differences, possess equal rights to higher education practices, which require 
Ubuntu as inclusion to embrace “equalization of voice.” Consequently, to 
attain the level where people exercise their voice and listen attentively 
without considering which gender or group is making the claim, Africa 
needs to educate citizens on such attributes. If all human beings indeed have 
equal intelligence, then higher education in Africa needs to create an 
environment in which all people can exercise their equality through voice. 
Remarkably, a Rancièrean “equalization of voice” could be a plausible 
approach and yardstick for substantive inclusion in HE in Africa. 
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4. Equalization of Voice and the Implications for University Pedagogy  
 
Here we show how equalization of voice can be enacted, and we identify and 
suggest how voice could be promoted through the three facets of university 
pedagogy, namely governance and management, classroom engagements 
and research. We argue that it is only through the reconceptualization of the 
taken-for-granted approaches and views, in this case Ubuntu as inclusion, 
that education institutions may enact inclusionary systems.  
 
4.1 University Governance and Management 
 
University governance and management should frame the policy and 
practices within the equalization of voice towards a substantive inclusion. 
Firstly, there should be a clear pronouncement on the practical implications 
of the equalization of voice as a yardstick for the good of the entire 
institution. This requires policies and an environment that respects all 
people’s voices and affords students, staff members and leaders equal 
opportunities, irrespective of their differences. Secondly, recognition of the 
voice among management members should also break away from the 
traditional belief of looking at people based on gender in decision making, 
thereby leading to the domination of one over the other. University 
governance ought to transcend the gender divide in its attempts to advance 
the inclusion of all voices, especially those of the internally excluded groups. 
By so doing, their voices may make a meaningful contribution to democratic 
processes. Treating some people as the other should be discouraged, since 
this might trigger forms of discrimination and exclusion. Thirdly, university 
governance and management should begin to take seriously issues of 
marginalization and act publicly against all forms of injustice. Fourthly, 
university governance and management should treat all people as equal 
human beings, rather than as gendered beings, particularly in their allocation 
of courses, jobs and even leadership positions. Equally, they also should 
sensitize staff to their democratic responsibilities as a way of holding people 
accountable for the excluded group’s voices. Unless governance and 
management pronounce themselves clearly on what equalization of voice 
entails and how it should be attained, classroom engagements could be 
influenced.  
 
4.2 Classroom Engagements 
 
In classroom engagements, all students (especially the internally excluded) 
should be encouraged to air their views, while the others are expected to 
listen attentively. This requires lecturers and all staff involved to be 
informed of the equalization-of-voice framework in which all people’s 
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voices are heard, irrespective of their differences. Classrooms should be 
friendly to the voices of the marginalized groups so that they can develop 
confidence and ability to air their views and participate like others. Waghid 
(2005: 340) offers a compelling argument that university classrooms require 
not only the socializing of students with an implicit body of facts and 
knowledge-constructs about society, human values and different cultural 
traditions, but also should initiate them into a discourse of critical 
questioning so that they challenge what they have been taught. Thus, the 
enactment of active and attentive listening among students may enable the 
marginalized groups to express their ideas without fear of rejection; as 
Rancière (1999) puts it, as a way of exercising their freedom and equality 
through a voice. In exercising one’s right, Waghid and Smeyers (2012) 
assert that the embodiment and practice of Ubuntu in HE can be propelled 
when everyone’s voice and experience would be listened to and respected. 
Affording all people, especially the marginalized groups, the opportunity to 
be included would unlock their cognitive and intellectual ability to express 
themselves freely within an enabling environment, and vindicate democratic 
HE in Africa. Waghid and Smeyers (2012: 6) postulate that educational 
institutions on the African continent ought to become concerned especially 
with cultivating Ubuntu as respect for persons in terms of which everyone 
deliberates freely in a humane and communally engaging manner. This 
implies that these educational institutions need to be concerned with creating 
democratic and responsible citizens and future leaders who are attenuated to 
the humane practice of Ubuntu.  
 
4.3 Research  
 
Firstly, the university should create enabling processes and practices in terms 
of which the marginalized groups (women) are encouraged and afforded 
opportunities to engage in commonly male- dominated fields such as science 
and engineering. Secondly, there should be recognition of their voice 
through research and funding set aside for the marginalized groups 
especially women in male-dominated research fields, such as science, IT, 
engineering and so forth. Thirdly, the university ought to offer the necessary 
support in promoting unfamiliar voices in such areas. We strongly argue that 
the recognition of the voices of the marginalized groups in such research 
areas may lead to many female students pursuing studies in male-dominated 
fields and contributing to knowledge production. By so doing, women’s 
voices, just like those of other marginalized groups, may become part of the 
university research focus and may lead to a balanced and equally represented 
university system and entire society. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This article has reconceptualized Ubuntu as inclusion, drawing from 
different perspectives – the traditional African, and Western liberal and post-
liberal viewpoints. We have argued that the African notion of Ubuntu could 
be construed as inclusion, since it involves communal practices and seeing 
humanity in others as opportunities for inclusion, thus looking differently at 
African philosophy and idea of knowledge culture. Despite Ubuntu’s 
inclusive nature, some people, particularly the marginalized groups ‒ the 
poor, people with disabilities, women and homosexuals ‒ are being excluded 
and their voices are not heard, which undermines the democratic ideal of the 
inclusion of all people. In attempts to understand Ubuntu as inclusion, we 
used Young’s (2000) interpretation, which reveals the subtle form of 
exclusion within inclusion. In order to enhance Ubuntu as inclusion, we 
examined Ranciere’s view of voice as an alternative means of engendering 
internal inclusion. Our argument is that Ubuntu as inclusion ought to 
transcend physical representation, status and popularity in order to include 
the voices of all disadvantaged and excluded groups, irrespective of their 
differences. Our contention is that there are inherent forms of exclusion 
within efforts at inclusion that perpetuate the exclusion of marginalized 
groups, such as women in Africa. The impasse calls for a post-liberal theory, 
and a Rancièrean perspective of “equalization of voice” could offer a 
deconstructed view for advancing substantive inclusion. Thus, this article 
defends “equalization of voice” as a plausible approach to enhancing Ubuntu 
as inclusion, since it possesses the ability to disrupt inequality and engender 
a substantive inclusion in university pedagogy, namely governance and 
management, classroom engagement and research. Unless university 
pedagogy embraces and enacts the equalization-of-voice framework, the 
marginalized groups – in this case women – may not make meaningful 
contributions to knowledge production and substantive inclusion may not be 
realized. 
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